the foundation for various development activities like protyping and simulation, code generation, and testing [8] . To perform a thorough safety assessment, it is crucial to understand not only how a system behaves in its normal working condition (represented in the nominal model), but also in the presence of failure(s). This is done by extending the nominal model with failure information to construct the failureaugmented model, termed fault model [9] or error model [14] .
Automated analysis of models brings substantial benefits as it simplifies the process, lightens the burden on designers and analysts, saves time and contributes to more reliable results. It also enables safety analysis to be incorporated as part of an iterative design process -as new results can be more easily generated to reflect changes -and therefore driving the design with safety in mind.
The two most prominent paradigms of MBSA today are Compositional Safety Analysis (CSA) and Behavioural Safety Analysis (BSA) .
CSA techniques are widely used to assist the process of reliability engineering. It uses predictive models of system failure which can be produced in the form of wellknown safety artefacts like fault trees. System models can be decomposed into structural hierarchies, and the local failure logic of components in these hierarchies is provided by analysts. Faults trees or FMEAs are then automatically produced by establishing how the local effects of component failures combine as they propagate through the topology of the system. The process is flexible and adaptable to different stages of model development. This is particularly valuable as assessment can be started early in the design process when concrete system details are still minimal. CSA produces safety artefacts (e.g. fault trees) which are familiar to safety engineers, making the process more intuitive. These artefacts identify potential failures and design weaknesses which can guide possible design modifications, and help to derive and refine requirements. CSA techniques allow quantitative analysis and in some cases also architectural optimization. Despite these strengths, CSA techniques provide no support for formal verification. Analyses with FTA and FMEA are generally static, and do not take into consideration the changes in system states and are therefore unable to capture dynamic behaviour. This limitation has been to some extent addressed in HiP-HOPS with a recent extension that enables assessment of sequences of failures via synthesis of temporal fault trees and FMEAs [13] . Techniques which are based upon the CSA approach include Hierarchically Performed Hazards Origin and Propagation Studies (HiP-HOPS) [11] , Component Fault Trees [10], and State-Event Fault trees (SEFT) [6] .
BSA, on the other hand, generally aims to facilitate system verification. In BSA, system-level effects of failures are constructed by injecting faults into the formal specification of the system. This technique commonly employs model checking to allow formal verification. Model checking verifies safety properties which represent safety requirements and enables the assessment of dynamic behaviour. Formal models are expressed as state automata (or "finite state machines") in the language of the particular technique, while safety properties are usually expressed in temporal logic. Model checker tool performs exhaustive exploration to assess whether a safety property holds for the system. The tool produces a counterexample when a safety property does not hold to show traces of "simulation" on how the breaching condition is reached.
BSA facilitates automated formal verification and captures dynamic behaviours. It is also possible to differentiate between transient and permanent failures and model the temporal ordering of failures. However, its limitation include the fact that most model checker tools require the system model to be expressed in that particular model checker input language. Safety artefacts like fault trees produced from model checker generally have "flat" structure representing disjunction of all minimal cut sets, which can hamper understanding of the fault trees. The analysis is also typically qualitative in nature, and not probabilistic. Formal models (which are required as the input to model checker) are only developed at later stage where designs are more mature, detailed and stable. Lastly, model-checking-based approaches are computationally expensive and inductive in nature, which means that the exhaustive assessment of the effects of combinations of component failures can potentially be infeasible in larger systems. Examples of techniques which are based on this approach include Altarica 
INTEGRATED APPLICATION OF COMPOSITIONAL AND BEHAVIOURAL SAFETY ANALYSIS (IACOB)
CSA and BSA emerged with little integration. While the differences in strengths, limitations, and assessment objectives of both techniques are acknowledged, we also recognize that the above techniques are complementary and could yield substantial benefits when applied together. Here we propose a method called Integrated Application of Compositional and Behavioural Safety Analysis (IACoB). IACoB is a safetydriven method which exploits analysis results from quick iterative CSA techniques to derive a more-robust, safety-driven model prior to the application of BSA. The method can be iterated until a satisfactory design that fulfils safety requirement criteria is reached. The key steps involved in IACoB analysis are illustrated in Figure 1 . HiP-HOPS is selected to facilitate CSA in IACoB as a representative CSA technique and the NuSMV model checker is selected to facilitate BSA.
IACoB starts with the construction of a system model, which can be an early functional model or a more detailed architectural model, depending on the stage of the system development. At early stages of design, a functional model of the system is established, which shows input, processing and output functions and dependencies among them, e.g. the data exchanged among functions (or material and energy in the general case). Once the model is constructed, design engineers examine further this model in order to evaluate the severity of failures of output functions, i.e. functions provided by the system to users and its environment. Each function is then annotated with its local failure behaviour in the style of HiP-HOPS, enabling automated preliminary FTA to be conducted via application of CSA. This can be done by assigning each component a set of output deviations, input deviations and hypothesised internal malfunctions that lead to those output deviations. This allows failure logic to be developed and the propagation of failure to be established. Automated algorithms such as those in HiP-HOPS can then be applied to perform the automated construction and analysis of system fault trees and FMEAs. These analyses will show the effect of hypothesised component failure modes on system outputs, which in turn allows the results to be checked against safety requirements. By identifying and studying how a component failure might lead to a catastrophic system failure, safety measures can be devised, for example, by enforcing a requirement on the design of the component, modifying the system structure or introducing safety mechanisms and fault tolerant features. Focus is placed especially on component failures that may have catastrophic or critical effects on the system, as they need to be prevented by design -or at least their impact minimized. In general, FMEAs can be used to show the effects of hypothesised component failures, and then help decide whether failures can be tolerated or not. Intolerable failures must become sufficiently unlikely by appropriate design of the component or external detection and recovery mechanisms must be put in place. Tolerable failures may be allowed to happen resulting in loss of functionality but always in the context of a graceful transition to degraded-but-safe modes of operation. In the cases of tolerable failures, FMEA result leads to design solutions that introduce, or enforce, these new "degraded modes" where components have failed but the system maintains its safety related functions.
The results of the FMEA can therefore be used to drive the refinement of the design of components and system modes. The process of design refinement is systematic and guided by the results of CSA. In the next step of the process, abstract state machines are constructed to show how graceful transition to the identified degraded modes could be achieved. Driven by these results, design iteration take places to incorporate these new degraded modes in an improved version of the system model. In general, system states are organized into functional states, where on each state, the system delivers a different set of functions. Component failures typically cause functional losses and malfunctions which lead the system from normal to degraded and ultimately failed modes. Once state machines showing these transitions have been derived, model checking technology is used to verify that safety properties hold on these state machines and get assurance that early designs incorporate correct interpretations and specifications of safety requirements. BSA in the form of model checking can be used to verify both the general dynamic behaviour of the system and the particular effect of any fault tolerance mechanisms that have been introduced following interpretation of CSA results.
As the design of the system is refined, state machines can provide very detailed representations of behaviour. In the course of the proposed process, CSA and BSA are usefully being applied together. The results of the CSA help to improve the architecture of the system, via introduction of fault detection and fault tolerance where appropriate, but they also guide the construction of behavioural system models that can be subjected to rigorous and detailed BSA. This proc4ess can be iterated as the design evolves. At later stages of design, CSA studies can become much more detailed and quantitative in nature. Failure annotations of components can be extended to include real failure modes and probabilistic component failure data. Such failure modes include electrical and mechanical of hardware caused by wear and environmental conditions or, in the case of composite systems that also include software, statistically observed functional failures caused by unspecified random or systematic faults. The results can be used to quantitatively predict the reliability, safety and availability of the system. Such prediction forms a necessary and important component of the system safety assessment process. 
INTRODUCTION TO BRAKE-BY-WIRE SYSTEM
Brake-by-wire systems replace traditional automotive braking components (like brake boosters, pumps, and master cylinders) with electronic sensors and actuators. Brake-by-wire systems can have hydraulic backup or not. The former, also known as Electric Hydraulic Brake (EHB) technology is realized through hydraulic pumps and additional electrically controlled valves. If the electronic control fails, the complete electric hydraulic system will be deactivated and the brake system will behave like a pure hydraulic system which delivers only emergency brake function with reduced brake force. Brake-by-wire without hydraulic backup is known as Electric Mechanical Brake (EMB) and uses only computer controlled electro-mechanical actuators. EMB does not possess the fail-safe mechanics of hydraulic backup, and therefore must be developed with strict fault tolerant properties.
The hypothetical brake-by-wire system used in this example is based upon a model by Daimler [12] but also draws from designs in [7] and [3] . The system consists of one vehicle-level processing function and four local-level wheel processing functions. The vehicle-level processing function reads in brake command input from the driver, communicated through a human-machine interface (for example, the brake pedal or parking brake interface), and subsequently generates braking command for each locallevel wheel processing functions based on high-level advanced brake functions such as an Anti-Lock Brake System (ABS). Local-level wheel processing functions are located physically close to the wheels and control the provision of braking energy. Upon receiving braking command from the vehicle-level processing function, each local-level processing function calculates the value of braking pressure, taking into consideration various local-level information including actuator position and speed. This value of braking pressure is then fed to an actuator which then applies the actual braking pressure on the corresponding wheel of the car.
ANALYSIS OF SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL MODELS
In accordance with the IACoB method, we start the safety assessment process from a high-level functional model. For this simplified system, two initial main functions can be delivered: 1) Function which delivers basic braking 2) Function which delivers braking with driving assistance anti-lock (ABS). These two functions can arguably be combined into one as they are not physically distinct. In this early model, however, they are free from architectural detail and are modelled as two separate logical functions to facilitate the illustration of function delivery.
The Matlab Simulink model illustrated in Figure 2 represents a high-level abstraction of the brake-by-wire system. It is simplified to consist of input functions, braking command processing functions (vehicle-level and local-level), ABS command processing function, and output functions. As local-level processing provides identical function for each wheel of the vehicle, we assume it is sufficient to discuss and analyze one (instead of all four) in this initial model. There are four input blocks which read the driver demand from the brake pedal (Input_brakeDemand), readings for wheel speed ( Input_wheelSpeed), external variable readings (Input_external) , and local-level feedback (Input_local). Information on brake demand, wheel speed and the external environment is passed to the vehicle-level processing function (VehicleLevelProcessing) which calculates and generates the independent brake commands for each local-level processing (LocalLevelProcessing). It also relays the information needed for ABS calculation to the ABSProcessing function. The wheel local-level processing controls the output functions which provide braking energy for basic braking or ABS braking. This early model does not yet incorporate any fault tolerance mechanisms. 
FUNCTIONAL FAILURE ANALYSIS
Once the model is constructed, we proceed to perform the FFA on the system. The main aim of this process is to classify and analyse the effects and severity of failures in the output functions, BasicBraking and ABSBraking. In this case the focus is placed on the omission and commission failure types, although it is also possible to perform analysis on value or timing failures. Table 1 presents an extended FFA which includes identification of detection, potential recovery plan and recommendation columns for each failure. From the examination of this FFA table, it can be seen that the severity of an omission failure of function BasicBraking (O-BasicBraking) is categorized as having a catastrophic effect, and therefore should be mitigated with fault tolerant design. The second functional failure related to the provision of braking pressure is commission. The commission failure in BasicBraking function (C-BasicBraking) is identified as having critical consequences and therefore should not be allowed to propagate and wrongly influence other functions. One way to achieve this is by detecting the commission failure, forcing the system to fail silent and then handling the omission accordingly by putting a fault-tolerant mechanism in place. The failure for the ABSBraking function is categorized as having catastrophic severity in its commission failure and marginal effects in its omission failure. This is due to the nature of the ABSBraking function which provides driving assistance rather than those of imperative role in braking. This suggests that it is more favourable for the function to fail in omission, and therefore the function should fail-silent when commission failure is detected.
FMEA
Functional blocks in the model are then annotated with failure behaviour before fault trees and FMEA can be generated and analyzed using HiP-HOPS tool. As the initial design does not include any fault-tolerant strategies, the initial FMEA table will show us how each internal malfunction (recorded in "Failure Mode" column) in every function can become direct contributors to the omission and commission failures of the braking and ABS functions. To implement a more robust design, several advisable design changes can also be determined from an analysis of the FMEA table. Severity is the effect of functional failure on the output fnctions of the system. Based on this effect, the criticality of the functional failure can be established and a recommendation can be made. One important (and most obvious) technique to achieve fault-tolerance is the introduction of redundancy in the "module". Module here refers functions in functional models or components in more refined architectural models. In common practice, fault tolerant design for brake-by-wire systems can be implemented through either the inclusion of a hydraulic system (EHB system) or through replicated electronic components (EMB system). For this example, we introduce a hybrid system which implements both hydraulic as well as redundant electronic modules (with lower numbers of redundant modules compared to a pure electronic EMB).
The analysis of FMEA therefore provides an insight that assists us in distinguishing critical functional failures that contribute to failures which have catastrophic or critical consequences (O-BasicBraking, C-BasicBraking, C-ABSBraking) from those that contribute to failures with marginal effects (O-ABSBraking). This knowledge subsequently allows us to establish the appropriate resource management priority and design improvement.
For example, Input_brakeDemand function and the Input_locals function are identified to be the contributing causes to O-BasicBraking which is catastrophic, and therefore it is necessary to configure these functions to be at least fail-operational by introducing a redundant module to backup each function. Failure in Input_external and Input_wheelSpeed only leads to O-ABSBraking and therefore in this example, will be tolerated. We also identified that there is a need to introduce a redundant function for VehicleLevelProcessing as its failure also leads to O-BasicBraking. Additionally, LocalLevelProcessing can be connected directly to the function Input_brakeDemand to read raw braking command. This way, when VehicleLevelProcessing function fails basic braking command can still be obtained. Similarly, an omission failure in basic braking caused by internal malfunction in LocalLevelProcessing and BrakingEnergy can be mitigated by introducing redundant functions to support these critical functions. In addition to this independent redundancy for individual modules, we could also include a hydraulic function which acts as the group backup mechanism to provide emergency braking in the presence of failures that affect the electrical-based functions. Commission failures on both braking and ABS functions have been identified as critical and catastrophic respectively. It is therefore recommended that any function which leads to commission failure should fail-silent instead. This can be achieved by deactivating or switching off the function whenever a commission failure is detected. This, in turn, transforms the commission failure into omission failure, which will then be treated accordingly. These changes are reflected in the revised model illustrated in Figure 3 . Shaded areas within each module represent redundancy. The inclusion of these new redundant mechanisms results in the introduction of new failure behaviours, which requires the FTA and FMEA to be updated. The new fault-tolerant redundant structure means that there are no longer any single-point failures which directly cause O-BasicBraking.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATE MACHINE
FTA and FMEA can be iterated until the design model meets early predefined requirements, for example until a satisfactory level of functional redundancy is achieved and the system is tolerant to n number of failures. In this example, we assume that elimination of single point failures for O-BasicBraking is sufficient. Next, we proceed and model the design dynamic behaviour by constructing an abstract state machine.
To do this, it is first of all, important to identify the primary elements of state machine: abstract states (referred to as "modes") and transition events. Modes are derived based upon provision of system functions, which in this case are the BasicBraking function and the ABSBraking function. Here we summarize three modes the system that can be derived by considering the delivery of functions: 1) Normal (BBW_Normal) mode where both Braking and ABS functions are delivered. 2) Permanent Degraded (BBW_PD) mode where basic Braking is delivered, but ABS function can no longer be delivered. 3) Fail (BBW_Fail) mode where no braking pressure is delivered.
Transitions can be formulated according to the failures that could occur to each of the functions; in this case, all such failures are of omission type as commission failures have been transformed into omissions by design. To more closely reflect the inclusion of different type of pressure source, we could refine the function BasicBraking into Electrical and Hydraulic. Subsequently, dynamic behaviour can now be modelled in the following modes: 1) Normal (BBW_Normal) mode where both basic braking and ABS braking functions are delivered. Braking function in normal mode is delivered through the primary source, Electrical module.
2) Permanent Degraded 1 (BBW_PD1) mode where braking function is delivered by the Electrical module, but the ABS braking function can no longer be delivered.
3) Permanent_Degraded2 (BBW_PD2) mode where braking pressure is delivered by Hydraulic module, ABS function is not delivered. 4) Fail mode where no braking pressure is delivered.
This can be illustrated in Figure 4 . It is also important to note how inclusive the transition definitions are when modelling dormant functions. For example, the mode chart in Figure 4 is appropriate in a situation where the hydraulic back up is only activated when O-Electrical is detected. However, for "hot standby" where hydraulic backup is continuously active, the transition definitions need to be updated. This is because it is possible for failure O-Hydraulic to occur when the system is operating in BBW_Normal mode. To promote a more transparent systematic degradation phase, it can be helpful to consider failure in hydraulic line during the normal operational mode. One possible way to better address this is by introducing an additional temporary mode (BBW_TD1), to model the failures in the Hydraulic function when basic braking is provided correctly through Electrical system. This degraded BBW_TD1 mode could serve as a potential warning that the backup function has failed before the primary function, a state in which potential recovery steps can also be included and performed. This can be shown in the following mode chart: The accuracy of safety assessment and verification of safety requirements depends on the level of detail provided in the mode chart. For this reason, it can be useful to refine the abstracted mode chart. This can be done by refinement of events through minimal cut sets or through compositional annotation. Refinement through minimal cut sets is performed by replacing failure events with its set of minimal cut sets, while refinement through compositional annotation is done by utilizing HiP-HOPS failure annotation to establish connections between failure events.
VERIFICATION OF SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
To enable the verification of requirement properties, once the mode chart is constructed, it is converted into a NuSMV input model. For this high level NuSMV model, four modules are constructed to represent the system main module and each functional module (ABSBraking, Electrical, and Hydraulic). Among the requirement properties, safety requirements are often of primary concern. The process here aims to verify that the design goals are achieved, while ensuring that the model conforms to the safety requirements. Possible safety requirements that can be verified in this example are: "Driving assistance function(s) shall never hazardously interfere with the system state", "The system shall be able to withstand the occurrence of n failures, without entering a hazardous state", and "Dormant functions shall only be activated when needed". These requirements first have to be interpreted in terms of the behaviour specified in the mode chart model. The safety properties that can be verified are refined according to the refinement of the state machines. This refinement captures and retains the hierarchical composition of the model and allows more detailed verification to be performed. By examining the relationships between the dynamic behaviour of modules, it is now possible to verify more safety related requirements, from more straight-forward ones like "As long as Braking Energy ACT A is functioning, the Braking Energy function shall be present", or for a cold-standby system which examines the electrical and hydraulic modules: "Only either Electrical pressure or Hydraulic pressure shall be supplied at one time", to the effects of this function behaviour on the system modes: " System shall not be allowed to enter hazardous mode when Electrical system is functioning".
CONCLUSIONS
There is an increasing need for early safety analysis that can guide system design, particularly in complex safety-critical systems. In this chapter, we have presented IACoB, a systematic method that integrates application of state-of-the-art CSA and BSA techniques from early stages. The method utilizes the synergies between the two techniques, and assists analysis of topological and behavioural models, verification of safety requirements, identification of design weakness, and systematic design of degraded modes and fault tolerant strategies. An example of a brake-by-wire system was used to illustrate how the approach methodically achieves design improvements. In the context of this example, we demonstrated that it is possible to exploit the complementary strengths of CSA and BSA and achieve a combined application where the output of CSA creates useful input for BSA. The degree of automation enabled by the underpinning techniques allows analysis to be iterated, and contributes to a more-rigorous safety assessment. Future work includes application of the proposed concept in context of design using emerging architecture description languages such as AADL [5] and EAST-ADL [4] .
